Verified local facts
The four-corner identity wallet verifies holder, issuer, validity and recipient, then exposes only the minimum fields required for a stated application purpose.
Evidence reviewed
Help a Mauritius household prepare identity and address evidence using attributable evidence and a stop condition.
Decision checklist
The four-corner identity wallet verifies holder, issuer, validity and recipient, then exposes only the minimum fields required for a stated application purpose; review marker 113 applies this device only to “prepare identity and address evidence Mauritius” and the evidence boundaries named on this page.
Name the wallet's owner and task
Write the applicant name exactly as supported, product, purpose and application reference. Keep another person's documents outside unless a verified requirement and consent apply. A family relationship does not authorise automatic disclosure. The product task determines which evidence is relevant; a generic identity bundle invites unnecessary copying and confusion.
Check the holder corner
Compare the name and other required identifiers across the exact requested documents. Record a genuine difference rather than editing an image or guessing a format. Ask the authenticated provider how a variation should be evidenced. This corner confirms internal consistency only. It cannot determine the provider's broader identity assessment or final decision.
Check issuer and authenticity corner
Identify the issuing body, document type and visible security or reference information without publishing sensitive details. Do not rely on an unsolicited intermediary to validate or collect it. A scan looking plausible is not a reason to send it. Preserve the original and use the provider's confirmed route for any authenticity question.
Check validity and currency corner
Record issue and expiry where relevant and whether the provider's current checklist sets a recency expectation. Do not invent a universal Mauritius validity window. A document can be legally current yet outside a product's stated evidence request, or recently issued yet irrelevant. Keep the page date and provider instruction with the wallet.
Check recipient and destination corner
Independently authenticate the institution, domain and upload or handover route. Record who receives the item and how receipt is proved. A legal institution can still be impersonated through another channel. Do not email identity records merely because a message displays a known name. A destination change reopens verification before transmission.
Fold the minimum-data flap
Review each field against the application purpose. Mask or omit unrelated information where the confirmed process permits, and do not bundle statements or passwords into an identity response. Data-access rights and application disclosure are different activities. Record why every exposed field is needed and who requested it. Unclear purpose blocks release from the wallet.
Create the disclosure record
List document type, version, fields shared, recipient, channel, purpose, consent and time. Obtain a receipt or reference without storing the whole document in the log. If a resubmission is requested, connect it to the original reference and verify why. This record supports later correction or access questions without broadcasting private material. Run a field-by-field exposure rehearsal before transmission. Place the requested fields in the left column, the stated purpose in the centre and the consequence of withholding or masking each field in the right. Where the provider-owned instruction is unclear, stop and seek clarification through an authenticated contact rather than improvising. This rehearsal is not a method for altering genuine evidence. Names, dates and addresses must remain truthful and legible where required; the exercise only prevents unrelated details or adjoining documents from travelling accidentally. Next, create a destination fingerprint from the institution name, official channel, product and request date. Compare that fingerprint with the final envelope immediately before sending. A familiar logo, forwarded message or urgent call is insufficient authentication. After transmission, lock the sent version, receipt and purpose together so later requests can be compared with the exact earlier disclosure. If a replacement document is requested, record why the first was insufficient and whether the destination has changed. Never infer from document acceptance that identity review is complete, the application is likely to succeed or any proposed terms are suitable. Finally, set a retention review date chosen for household control rather than an invented institutional rule. At that review, distinguish the copy needed for the applicant's own record from uncontrolled duplicates. The wallet closes only when the disclosure record, authenticated destination and receipt can be reconstructed by a second household reviewer without opening unrelated personal files.
Seal without promising acceptance
A second person checks all corners and the minimum-data flap. The sealed wallet means identity evidence was organised and transmitted responsibly. It does not prove eligibility, reveal what MCIB participants hold or predict approval. If the product, checklist or recipient changes, make a new record rather than overwriting the earlier disclosure. The applicant can pause before every release. Add a breach-response card before sealing. It names whom to contact through an authenticated route if the wallet is sent to the wrong recipient, which record entry identifies the disclosure, and which unrelated copies must not be forwarded while seeking help. The card does not promise deletion or remedy. It ensures the applicant can describe the event precisely, preserve receipts and keep a data-rights question separate from application status. A provider decision cannot cure an uncontrolled disclosure, and a data request cannot decide the application. Review the card whenever destination, product or requested field changes.